基于修正Shapley模型的合同节水管理利益分配研究

Profit distribution of contract management for water conservation based on corrected Shapley model

合同节水管理引入社会化资本,具有广阔的应用前景,而其利益分配机制不健全成为实施推广的主要障碍之一。结合合同节水管理特点分析其核心利益相关者博弈关系,根据实际项目中参与方的成本投入、节水效果、风险承担等不同进行Shapley系数修正以克服模型缺陷,修正后节水收益由节水用户与资金提供者向节水服务公司流动,节水服务公司与节水用户获取最大收益,通过实证分析可得修正后的分配结果更趋向合理。

The introduction of social capital into contract management for water conservation has broad application prospects,while its profit distribution mechanism is not perfect,which becomes one of the main obstacles to the implementation of the promotion. The game relationship between the major stakeholders of contract management for water conservation is analyzed based on its characteristics. The Shapley model is corrected according to the investment costs,water-saving effects and different risk factors of parties involved so as to overcome the original defects. After correction,the wave-saving profit switches to water-saving service company from water-saving users and investors,and the water-saving service company and users get the largest profits. Through empirical analysis,the distribution results obtained by the corrected model are more reasonable.