文化企业营销服务提供商竞争博弈模型研究——基于个性化需求与服务延迟视角

Competition game model of marketing service provider in culture firm based on the service delay of personalized demand

本文主要研究服务水平对整合营销(IM)服务提供商竞争策略的影响,构建定制营销(CM)服务与IM服务博弈竞争模型,研究在CM实施周期和IM服务种类数确定的情况下,IM存在服务延迟时服务提供商的竞争博弈行为。结果显示,市场仅存在一种均衡状态,即价格竞争均衡。在该均衡结果中,IM服务提供商遵循"最大差异化"原则,仅提供一种标准化服务。CM服务提供商的利润总是会随着文化企业对CM服务实施周期敏感性的增加而降低,随着文化企业对IM服务不适程度的增加而提高,且CM服务二次开发可变成本的增加始终不利于CM服务提供商均衡利润的增加,而这些参变量对IM服务提供商均衡利润的影响,始终会受到CM二次开发可变成本的影响。越小的CM二次开发成本对IM服务提供商利润的提升越不利,因为较小的二次开发成本使得CM与IM之间成本差异化减小,致使双方竞争更加激烈,不利于IM服务提供商均衡利润的提升。

In order to characterize the influence of service level on competition strategy of integrated marketing （IM） service provider, we construct a game competition model between custom marketing （CM） service and IM Service, and research the competition game behavior of IM service provider when it＇s have a delay under the condition of CM implementation cycle and IM standardized service category number assure. Results show that： market have a state of equilibrium, namely price competition equilibrium. In the equilibrium results, IM service providers only provide a standardized marketing service because of the principle of ＂biggest differentiation＂. CM provider＇s profits will always be decrease with the susceptibility increase of CM service implementation cycle of cultural firms, and increase with degree of discomfort increase of IM service, and the increase of second development variable costs of CM service always go against the balanced profit increase of CM service providers. And the impact of these equilibrium on balanced profit of IM service providers will always be affected by second development variable costs of CM. The smaller the CM cost of secondary development, the more unfavorable to the promotion of IM service providers profit because its small cost of second development makes the cost differential between CM and IM decreases, competition more intense, and not conducive to the IM service providers equilibrium profit improvement.