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基于动态博弈的竞业限制合同效度的均衡分析 被引量:1

Equilibrium Analysis of Non-Compete Contract Validity Based on the Dynamic Game
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摘要 运用动态博弈理论,围绕合同效度,对用人单位与竞业限制人员的合同签订行为进行了分析,双方博弈的均衡结果表明:影响竞业限制合同效度的竞业限制范围、地域、期限、对受限制人员的经济补偿及违约金等要素的确定最终都由双方谈判忍耐度来决定;在忍耐度相同时,双方利益份额随忍耐程度由小到大,分别呈现"U型"和"倒U型"曲线形态。研究结论为用人单位有效签订竞业限制合同。 On the basis of the theory of dynamic game, around the contract validity, the contract behavior is analyzed between the unit and personnel subject to competition restrictions which two sides of game equilibrium results show that the restricted factors such as the influence scope of non-compete, geographical, time limit, economic compensation and liquidated damages are the determination of negotiation in patience. In patience phase at the same time, the two sides share interests with the tolerance from small to large, presenting "U" type and "U" curve form. Research conclusion provided reference basis for the unit to effective non-compete contracts and for the personnel subject to competition restrictions to legal rights and interest.
出处 《中国人力资源开发》 北大核心 2016年第10期91-96,共6页 Human Resources Development of China
基金 山东省高校科研发展计划-人文社科研究计划项目"个人信息保护的法律基础及其制度研究"(J15WE30)资助
关键词 竞业限制 合同效度 动态博弈 均衡分析 Non-Compete Contract Validity Dynamic Game Equilibrium Analysis
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