摘要
在MTO(按订单生产)和MTS(按库存生产)两种模式下,比对了信息不对称和信息共享下产品定价、废旧品回收率和零售商利润的区别,研究结果显示:(1)产品定价、废旧品回收率和零售商利润不受生产模式改变的影响;(2)在某些条件下,信息共享下产品的批发价、零售价、和废旧品回收率均高于信息不对称时的相应值,进行信息共享会增加闭环供应链的总体利润,但零售商有可能通过信息共享丧失信息优势,从而使得其利润受损。因此为了促使零售商参与信息共享,信息共享参与方应投资建立安全的通信系统,以保证共享信息不被泄露。另外本文通过引入纳什讨价还价模型建立了一个公平的利润划拨机制,该机制使得最后的利润划分只取决于各参与方的议价能力,与各参与方对通信系统投资大小无关。
A decentralized distribution closed-loop channel is considered. The manufacturer is the stackelberg leader of the channel, who has incorporated a remanufacturing process for used products into her original production system, so that she can manufacture a new product directly from raw materials, or remanufacture part or whole of a returned unit into a new product. Facing random demand of a single product with a short life cycle, a setting where the retailer has accurate demand information while the manufacturer does not is considered. Under the asymmetric and complete information condition, the product pricing, the re- covery rate and the retailer's profit in make-to-order scenario and make-to-stock scenario respectively are compared. It is found that: (1) the product pricing, the recovery rate and the retailer's profit are not affect- ed by the change of the production mode; (2) In some conditions, information sharing would increase the whole supply chain profit, but the retailer would lose the information superiority so that his profit would decrease. In order to attract the retailer to share his private information, the manufacturer and the retailer can invest to establish a security communication system jointly to assure to reach the demand information won't be revealed. Then the whole revenue of the closed-loop supply chain will be more than that in asymmetric information. For ensuring an information sharing equilibrium and an fairly revenue allocation, a nash bargain model is proposed, in which the manufacturer and the retailer not only get back the communicaiton investment cost, but also get more profit decided by their bargain power respectively and is independent of the amount of the communication system investment.
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第5期139-148,共10页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71472069)