交易者和管理者博弈视角下的网上信用风险演化

Evolution of online trust risk under the perspective of game between traders and regulators

网上信用风险对网上行为的负面影响至今仍是电子商务价值实现的障碍之一,而揭示网上信用风险的形成机理是解决该问题的前提。现有离散式的实证研究和基于经典博弈理论视角的研究与现实网上信用风险形成机理的实质存在差距。从演化博弈的视角,建立了基于交易者群体和管理者群体的演化博弈模型,两群体的演化博弈结果形成了在线信用风险,基于其演化博弈的推演发现:网上信用风险不会自发地向交易者守信且监管者不用监管的理想情景演化;一个较为合理的演化方向是交易者在监管者监管的状况下向守信策略演变,守信群体比例会随着监管力度、惩罚力度的提高而增加,监管力度则受到监管成本及监管收益的制约;监管者监管群体比例的大小受到交易者折现因子的影响,交易者的折现因子越小,采取监管策略的管理者群体的比例越大。

The negative impact of online credit risk on online behavior is still one obstacle hindering the realization of e-commerce values,and revealing the formation mechanism of online credit risk is a prerequisite for solving this problem. However,there is a gap between the existing empirical studies or classical game theory-based studies and the nature of the formation mechanism in reality. From the perspective of evolutionary game,this paper established an evolutionary game model based on the traders groups and regulators groups and the evolutionary game process of these two groups formed a certain level of online credit risk. We found： the ideal scenario including honest traders and regulators doing nothing would not appear;a more reasonable scenario was that strategy traders evolved to trustworthy ones under regulators＇ supervision,and the proportion of trustworthy traders would increase with the supervision and punishment intensity which was subject to the cost and benefit of supervision; and that the size of the regulators groups was affected by the discount factor of traders,the smaller the discount factor,the bigger the supervision group taking regulatory policies.