任性为什么不是自由的体现?——对黑格尔式自由观的一种微考察被引量：2

Why Arbitrariness Cannot Be an Expression of Freedom? A Detailed Study on Hegel's Idea of Freedom

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摘要黑格尔断言,任性不是自由的体现,为此他提出了两种关于自由的看似矛盾的判准:以强调主体在活动序列中是否充当首要原因为核心的"自我决定判准",和以关注主体能否认识与选择理性对象为核心的"智性主义判准"。前一种判准看重近代意义上的理性主体,后一者判准重视古典意义上的理性对象,两者之间似乎是截然对立的。要调和这样两种看似矛盾的判准,关键在于引入黑格尔关于"形式理性"和"具体理性"的区分。在黑格尔那里,"形式理性"是一种空洞的、缺乏自身内容的,无法在活动中进行自我决定的概念;与之不同,"具体理性"是一种实质性的、拥有自身内容的、能够在活动中进行自我决定的理性。黑格尔在断言任性不是自由的体现时,所依靠的正是具体理性而非形式理性。由于"具体理性"是拥有内容,能够进行自我决定的理性,因而借助"具体理性"概念,我们可以将黑格尔关于自由的"智性主义判准"所强调的对象因素,不再单纯理解为与主体无关的外在因素,而是理解为主体通过"具体理性"自我决定、自我创造的产物。这样一来,"智性主义判准"就可以被视为"自我决定判准"的一种变体,两种判准之间的矛盾与对立便可得到化解。因此,只要辨明黑格尔在"形式理性"和"具体理性"之间所作的明确区分,我们即可申言,在讨论任性是否是自由之体现时,黑格尔并没有在两种相互矛盾的判准之间犹疑不定,而是始终坚定不移地忠实于近代意义上以主体自我决定能力为核心的"自我决定判准"。 Hegel claims that arbitrariness cannot be considered as an expression of freedom. For this claim he provides two kind of seemly opposing criterions. One is the Self-determination Criterion,which emphasizes the agent＇s role as the major causal power in actions; the other is the Intellectualism Criterion,which concerns the agent＇s capacities for recognizing and choosing rational objects as its content. In order to harmonize these two opposing criterions,it is important to introduce Hegel＇s distinguishing between Formal Reason and Concrete Reason. According to Hegel,formal reason could not achieve self-determination in actions,for it is formal,empty,and containing no content within itself.In contrast,due to containing content in itself,concrete reason has its capacity to conduct self-determination in actions. When Hegel claims that arbitrariness is not the expression of freedom,he has the concrete reason not the formal in mind. In virtue of the concept of concrete reason,we could consider the rational object appreciated by Intellectualism Criterion not as an external alien element,but as the internal product of the agent＇s self-determination and self-creation. Then the opposition between these two criterions could be overcome by understanding Intellectualism Criterion as a variation of Self-determination Criterion. In sum,Hegel shows no hesitation between two opposing criterions if his distinguishing between formal reason and concrete reason could be taken seriously. Hegel has a longstanding commitment to Self-determination criterion.

作者陈浩

机构地区清华大学哲学系

出处《复旦学报（社会科学版）》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第3期110-117,共8页 Fudan Journal（Social Sciences）

基金教育部委托清华大学自主科研项目"黑格尔的自由理论研究"(项目批准号:20151080425)的阶段性成果

关键词任性自我决定智性主义形式理性具体理性 arbitrariness self-determination intellectualism formal reason concrete reason

分类号 B516.35 [哲学宗教—外国哲学]

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1Hegel, Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1970.
2Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of-Right, Allen Wood ( ed. ) . trans. H. B. Nisbet. Cambridge : Cambrid~,e University Press. 1991.
3Alan Patten, Hegel's Idea of Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 43.
4Robert Pippin, H~gel's Practical Philosophy, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 2008, p. 127.
5Allen Wood, Hegel's Ethical Thought, Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 52.
6Dean Moyar, Hegel's Consdence ( Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011 ) 11 -12.
7, Patten,Hegel's Idea of Freedom, pp. 3 -5.
8" Hegel's position on freedom can be characterized as neither voluntarist, nor inteUectualist, nor anti-intellecmalist. " see Pippin, Hegel's Practical Philosophy, p. 143.
9See Alan Patten, Hegel's Idea of Freedom, chapter 2, 3, and Paul Franco, Hegel's Philosophy of Freedom ( New Haven and London. Yale University Press, 1999 ) 162 - 168.
10"The menu from which he chooses, is given by nature. '" See Patten, Hegel's Idea of Freedom, p. 50.