对赌协议与公司法资本管制:美国实践及其启示

VAM and Corporate Capital Regulation: the US Practice and Its Implications for China

海富案再审判决催生了"可以与股东对赌,不得与公司对赌"的流行解读,批评者则惋惜司法守旧,未能如美国法院那样拥抱创业创新与合同自治。然而,以海富案之对赌协议作为参照系观察美国PE/VC的法律实践可以发现,硅谷克服初始投资作价不确定性的安排并非公司现金补偿,而是分期融资机制与股权比例调整;PE投资者的优先股被赎回则须受制于资本维持原则以及清偿能力的双重限制。进一步,特拉华州Thought Works案展示了美国法院如何具体适用资本维持原则于赎回交易的过程,反衬出目前对海富案的流行解读之谬误。对赌协议的裁判核心不在于交易类型的合法性判断,而是合同履行之可能性,后者需要基于公司财务状况来具体分析。即使PE与公司进行现金对赌,也可能因未损及公司资本与清偿能力而具有正当性。因此,无论是海富案的流行解读还是学理批评都存在纠偏之必要,一个充满活力的PE/VC投资市场也完全可以尊重公司法以及资本维持原则的底线。

The mainstream reading of the Chinese Supreme Court＇ s judgment on Haifu Case points to the dual courses of judicial treatment of VAM, i. e. , the VAM between share- holders would be fine while those between the shareholder（s） and the company would not sur- vive judicial review. Besides, the criticism favors U. S. courts＇ support for innovation and free- dom of contract in contrast with Chinese courts＇ conservative attitude. Through Haifu＇ s lens, however, we can see that, in the U. S. legal practice in PE/VC, cash-compensation by the company is not used as a tool to overcome the difficulty and uncertainty in the valuation of initial investment; rather, staged finance and the adjustment of shareholding percentage have been preferred. The Delaware Case on ThoughtWorks shows how U. S. judges would apply the princi- ple of capital maintenance to the redemption of shares, which further highlights the misreading on Haifu judgment. The core issue in VAM cases such as Haifu is not the legality of the con- tract, but the possibility of the performance of contract, the analyses of which depends on the fi- nancial situation of the relevant company. The VAM between the PE and the invested company would definitely pass the legal test in case the performance of VAM would not hurt the capital, nor cause insolvency. In sum, both the mainstream reading and the criticism need to be re-ex- amined and an efficient PE market does not necessarily lead to the abandonment of the principle of capital maintenance