东北野战军辽西会战决策的演变

Near Misses:A Study on the Northeast Field Army during the Liaoxi Campaign

1948年10月辽西会战中,国民党军内部意见不一,西进兵团行军方向犹疑不决,对东北野战军的敌情判断和作战部署构成了不小的挑战。林彪在战役判断和兵力部署上多次出现偏差,却未对东北野战军全歼西进兵团造成根本性影响,原因在于:他将阻止西进兵团返回沈阳作为战役取胜关键,几次调整围歼作战地域;东北野战军第6纵队遇到突发事件敢于灵活处置,把因林彪的决策疏漏有可能造成的不利后果降到最小程度;东北野战军第5、第7、第8、第10纵队等敢于承担阻敌重任,西进兵团行动迟缓,都为林彪修正判断、调整部署提供了宝贵时间。

During the Liaoxi Campaign in October 1948,the KMT troops changed their marching directions more than once because of disagreement among themselves,which posed a great challenge to the Northeast Field Army. Lin Biao made several mistakes in judgment and in troop deployment,but this did not affect the overall outcome of the campaign owing to the following factors. The key to the victory of the Campaign for Lin was to prevent the enemy troops from returning to Shenyang,and several times he adjusted the areas of operations. The 6th Column was capable of handling emergencies in a flexible manner when necessary,thus minimizing the adverse consequences of Lin＇s oversight in decision- making. The 5th,7th,8th and 10 th Columns were all ready to assume responsibility and the KMT troops going westward marched slowly,which left precious time for Lin to revise his judgment and adjust troop deployment.