我国地方发展型政府建构的制度基础与形态演变

The Institutional Foundation for the Building of China’s Local Developmental States and its Pattern’s Evolution:New Model or the Replay of East Asian Developmental States

改革开放以来,我国地方政府在辖区经济中发挥了非常积极的作用,包括发展型在内的政治经济范式都被用来描述这一时期地方政府的定位。财政激励和政绩考核赋予了地方发展经济的激励,成为地方发展型政府建构的必要条件。在国有经济成分有所收缩且日益掌握在中央和高层地方政府的情景下,中低层级的地方政府需要更多通过改善营商环境来吸引流动性资本。地方政府间的竞争有助于遏制官员的寻租行为,防范其过度侵害政府的'发展型'。我国地方发展型政府建构的制度基础与成长环境显示出浓厚的本土特色,并非东亚发展型国家原型的重演,而是发展型国家的一个单独子类。

Since the reform and opening up, China’s local governments have played a more active role in the localeconomy. Some political-economic paradigms, including the developmental states, have been used to describe the pattern of local economic controls. Financial incentives and cadre evaluation systems have offered local officials incentives to care more about local prosperity and become a necessary condition of building local developmental states. During the reform since 1993, local governments need more to attract capital by improving its business environments. Political competition among local jurisdictions helps to curb officials’ rent-seeking behaviors and prevent them from over-infringing on the governments’ development-ness. The Chinese case reveals an independent species among the developmental state generic, not as a repeat of the prototype of the East Asian developmentalstates.