官员晋升锦标赛:经济增长的政治逻辑——基于相关文献的梳理与分析

Official Promotion Tournament: Political Logic of Economic Growth—— Based on Sorting and Analysis of the Relevant Literature

改革开放30多年来,经济与社会快速发展,同时也伴随着许多问题,这一切都源于中国式分权的制度安排。经济分权提高了地方发展经济的积极性,政治集权又确保各级官员不受地方利益集团所牵制。"向上负责"的官员晋升机制解释了地方政府作为经济发展"援助之手"的原因。为了获得政治晋升,下级官员必须遵从上级制定的政策目标。上级政府通过相对绩效考核方式,制造了下级政府"为增长而竞争"的强大激励。这种以经济增长为基础的政治锦标赛在中国广泛存在,虽然有力地促进了地方经济增长,但也不可避免地导致地方保护主义、软公共产品供应不足、虚假数据和重复建设等消极现象的出现。近些年来学界的许多研究表明,围绕着经济增长与官员晋升的相关理论一直争论不断。

Over the past more than 30 years of reform and opening up,economy and society have developed rapidly,but alsoaccompanied by many problems,which are due to institutional arrangement of Chinese style decentralization. Economic decen-tralization has improved the enthusiasm of economic development for local governments,political centralization has ensuredthat officials at all levels are not captured by local interest groups. Promotion mechanism for officials responsible to the＂high-er authorities＂could explain the local governments as＂helping hands＂of economic development. In order to obtain politicalpromotion,lower-level officials must abide by policy objectives of the higher authorities. The higher-level governments havecreated strong incentives through the relative performance evaluation on the lower-level governments＂for growth and competi-tion＂. Many empirical studies have shown that the political tournament based on economic growth exists widely in China,which has played an important role in the local officials at all levels to accelerate development,but also inevitably produces lo-cal protectionism,inadequate supply of soft public goods,false data,repeated construction and other negative phenomena. Inrecent years,many studies have showed that controversy around the economic growth theory and official promotion has notstopped.