摘要
与C2C在线拍卖相比,B2C在线拍卖因卖方较少且都已建立一定的声誉而降低了二手产品在线拍卖对声誉机制的依赖,强化了卖方的信号发送和买方的竞标行为对拍卖成交价的影响。基于京东在线拍卖数据,对B2C二手产品拍卖成交价格的实证研究发现,相较于竞标者行为,卖方的信号发送行为对拍卖成交价格的影响更大。基于分位数回归进一步发现,尽管发布同款新品价格和拍卖品新旧程度是最有效的信号发送行为,但是其对成交价格的影响随着拍卖品价值的提高而递减;竞标者数量及其竞价对拍卖成交价格的影响虽然较小,但是它随着拍卖品价值的提高而递增。
Comparing to C2 C online auction,B2 C online auction,which has less sellers but a higher established reputation,reduces the importance of reputation mechanism in asymmetric second- hand online auctions and strengthens the role of seller's signaling and buyer's bidding strategies in determining the final price.This study investigates the data from the JD. com auction platform and finds that the seller's signaling is much more important in determining the final price than the biddings of buyers. Further study with quantile regression indicates that the price effect of the seller's most effective signaling,such as listing the price of the new product sold on JD. com and the conditions of second- hand products,decreases with the value of second-hand product,while the price effect of the number and the competition of bidders,despite small,increase with the value of second- hand product.
出处
《产经评论》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第3期45-59,共15页
Industrial Economic Review
基金
国家社会基金青年项目"网络经济视角的中国产业结构优化升级机制及其实现路径研究"(项目编号:12CJY040
项目主持人:高彦彦)
中央高校基本业务科研费基金项目"互联网金融的信用甄别和风险控制机制研究"(项目编号:2242016S20013
项目主持人:高彦彦)
教育部人文社科基金项目"以互联网经济驱动产业结构调整:机制与政策建议"(项目编号:14YJC790107
项目主持人:孙军)
关键词
二手产品
B2C
在线拍卖
成交价
分位数回归
second-hand product
B2C
online auction
final price
quantile regression