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中国P2P平台声誉与服务费用的关系研究 被引量:3

An Empirical Analysis on the Relationship Between P2P Platform's Reputation and Service Fee in China
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摘要 成熟市场中良好声誉的P2P平台收取较高的服务费用是保证P2P市场有效性的重要机制,是提高资金借贷服务水平、建立和维护平台声誉的有效激励。利用网贷之家平台公布的P2P平台月度评级数据来检验中国P2P平台声誉与服务费用之间的关系。结果显示:中国P2P平台声誉与服务费用的关系呈现显著的负相关性。声誉机制作用不佳既反映了中国P2P市场不成熟的现状,也显示出该机制对平台激励和约束的有限性,不利于平台服务定价机制的有效形成。因此,需要尽快建立与平台服务价格相匹配的声誉机制。 In a mature market,the fact that P2P platforms with higher reputation charge more service fee than those with lower reputation is an effective encouragement for platforms to improve their service related with loans and build and maintain their reputation,which also guarantees P2P market efficiency. Through empirical analysis of P2P platform's rating data announced monthly by a P2P industry portal,this paper tests the relationship between P2P platform's reputation and service fee in China. The result shows that P2P platform's reputation and service fee appear in an obvious negative correlation. The unsatisfying state of reputation mechanism not only reflects that at present Chinese P2P market is still immature,but also weakens reputation mechanism's power to encourage and regulate platforms,which inhibits the formation of effective service fee pricing mechanism of P2P platforms. Therefore,to promote and guide P2P market standard,the paper reaches the conclusion that effective reputation mechanism which matches P2P platforms' service fee with their reputation should be formed as soon as possible.
作者 黄玲 孙柔嘉
出处 《产经评论》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第3期60-68,共9页 Industrial Economic Review
基金 江苏高校哲学社会科学研究重大项目"互联网金融产业的产业组织与政府管制研究"(项目编号:2015ZDAXM005 主持人:周勤) 重庆市教委人文社科项目"基于网络金融的重庆市小微企业成长的融资模式创新研究"(项目编号:14SKL03 主持人:黄玲) 渝东北地区农村与区域发展研究中心2015年开放基金项目"众筹参与主体的行为研究"(批准号:2015ydbzx-04 主持人:黄玲)
关键词 P2P 平台声誉 服务费用 P2P platform's reputation service fee
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