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大股东股权质押对公司价值影响的机理分析与研究综述 被引量:16

Influence of Block-Shareholder's Share Pledge on Firm Value: A Mechanism Analysis and A Literature Review
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摘要 大股东研究是公司治理中的核心领域之一,股权质押则具有杠杆交易的风险特征。本文对大股东股权质押对公司价值的影响机理进行了分析和研究综述。以大股东行为作为切入点,首先分析了大股东在公司治理中的作用,对公司价值的影响;然后,梳理了大股东股权质押的三种主要动机;其次,对大股东股权质押影响公司价值的机理及可能的后果进行了论述;最后,总结了现有研究中的不足并对后续研究进行了展望。 Researches on block-shareholder are one of the core aspects in corporate governance, share pledge has the risk characteristics of leverage transactions in the meanwhile. This paper analyzes the mechanism of block-shareholder 's share pledge and its impacts on the value of listed firms. From the perspective of block-shareholder, firstly, it analyzes block-shareholder's role in the corporate governance and its impacts on the firms. Secondly, it introduces the three main motivations of block-shareholder 's share pledge. Then, how block-shareholder's share pledge affects the listed firms' value and the possible consequences are discussed in this paper. Lastly, it summarizes the shortcomings of existing researches and prospects the further research.
作者 闻岳春 夏婷
出处 《上海金融学院学报》 2016年第2期5-13,共9页 Journal of Shanhai Finance University
基金 国家自然基金项目"中国资本市场系统稳定性评估与监测研究"(批准号:71273190)
关键词 大股东 股权质押 公司价值 公司治理 Block-shareholder Share pledge Firm Value Corporate Governance
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