摘要
我国企业会计制度选择空间的存在、公司治理及法制惩罚的薄弱使得盈余管理寻租行为难以避免。为有效治理盈余管理寻租,本文基于声誉视角,利用声誉动态博弈模型,分析外部投资者和政府监管者对盈余管理参与主体的多重声誉制约,最后提出声誉机制治理盈余管理寻租的相关措施。
The existence of Chinese accounting system deficiency, corporate governance and legal penalty has made rent-seeking behavior in earnings management inevitable. To effectively curb this behavior, using the dynamic game model of reputation, this article analyzed the multiple reputation restriction to the rent-seekers from the external investor and government regulators. Finally, proposals about how to curb earnings management from the angle of reputation mechanism were put forward.
出处
《财会通讯（中）》
北大核心
2016年第5期62-64,129,共3页
Communication of Finance and Accounting
关键词
声誉
盈余管理
寻租行为
Reputation
Earnings management
Rent-seeking behavior
