新型农业经营主体参与低碳农业发展的激励机制设计

Design of the incentive mechanism that new agricultural operators participate in low-carbon agricultural development

新型农业经营主体在一定程度上使得我国农业呈现集约化发展,为低碳农业发展提供组织保障,但是其自身没有发展低碳农业的动力。本文基于多任务委托-代理模型,从低碳农业发展过程中政府和新型农业经营主体之间的委托—代理关系为视角,设计政府激励和约束新型农业经营主体参与低碳农业发展的激励机制,促使其兼顾经济效益、环境效益和社会效益。结果表明由于缺乏评价标准,政府对新型农业经营主体在固碳减排效益方面比经济效益方面的不确定性更加明显,而不确定性程度与新型农业经营主体努力结果的可观测性呈负相关关系,固碳减排效益的不确定因素无限大的时候,其激励强度趋于0;在政府的补贴过程中,成本系数越高、绝对风险率越高和不确定因素越多,则政府的激励契约对新型农业经营主体的激励强度就越低,需要强化对新型农业经营主体在固碳减排效益和社会服务效益方面的激励强度;政府对经济效益的最优激励因子与其绝对风险规避呈正向相关,因此政府在对处于高风险规避期的新型农业经营主体组织给予较高的激励,而对于风险规避率较低的处于成熟期的新型农业经营主体组织给予较低的激励。最后对结论进行整理,并作出实际的解释和提出针对性的对策建议。

To a certain extent new agricultural operators make Chinese agriculture have a pattern of intensification, they provide organizational guarantee for low-carbon agricultural development. But there is no incentive for them to develop low-carbon agricuhure. From the perspective commissioned-agent relationship between government and new agricultural operators in the development of low- carbon agriculture, the paper designs the incentive mechanism to encourage and administrate new agricultural operators based on muhi- task principal-agent model, so that the operator can combine economic benefits, environmental benefits and social benefits. The results show that because of the lack of evaluation standard, the government ＇ s uncertainty for carbon emission reduction benefits becomes more obvious than economic benefit. The degree of uncertainty is negatively interrelated with the observability of the efforts of new main operators. The uncertainty of solid carbon reduction benefits of is infinite. The incentive strength tends to 0. In the process of government subsidies, higher cost coefficient, higher absolute risk rate and more uncertanties will bring lower incentive strength of new agricultural operators caused by government＇ s incentive contract. Therefore, strengthening incentive is needed when the intensity of incentive is low. The government＇ s optimal incentive factor of economic benefits is positively related to absolute risk aversion. The government gives higher incentive to the new operators in the period of high risk aversion ; on the contrary, the new operators in low rate of risk aversion receive less incentive. Finally the paper draws conclusions, and proposes some corresponding countermeasures.