REDD+项目中不确定性对森林碳减排量的影响研究

Effects of uncertainty on reduction of forest emissions in reducing emissions from deforestation and degradation-plus( REDD + ) programs

减少砍伐和退化所致排放(REDD+)项目旨在通过采取各种政策方法和积极的激励措施,以帮助发展中国家减少砍伐和森林退化,同时还包括森林保护、森林可持续经营以及增加森林碳信用。在REDD+项目实施过程中,对于碳减排量的准确监测与度量是一个非常重要的步骤,而不确定性问题的普遍存在将可能对碳减排量产生影响。本文通过建立一个包含REDD+项目开发商和代理人两个博弈者的动态博弈模型,通过对动态博弈模型的仿真研究,分析了不确定性对利益相关者收益以及森林碳减排量的影响。研究结果表明,不确定性会使得森林碳减排量增加,以弥补因不确定性所导致的低估量。同时,不确定性的增加也会导致碳排放量的补偿支付价格增长。由于不确定性只会对代理人补贴产生影响,而不会影响开发商补贴,因而向开发商提高补贴更能促进利益相关者的利润增加。并且不确定性越大效果越明显,因此在未来向开发商而非代理人提供补贴才是政策制定者的最佳选择。由于REDD+项目中除了能给开发商和代理人带来收益之外,还以可以增进全社会环境和生态福利水平,而这种外部收益在"森林碳信用"的市场价格中并未得到完全体现,因此需要政策制定者为REDD+项目提供经济激励以弥补这种外部收益。政策制定者选用补贴模式时应优先考虑基于开发商补贴建立公平有效的激励机制。同时,为保证资金被完全用于REDD+的项目之中,并被负责任地按照预期目标使用,因此需要建立能满足国际标准的良好财政治理机制以预防腐败和欺诈,促进REDD+项目的成功实施。

Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation （ REDD ＋ ） programs not only help developing countries reduce deforestation and forest degradation through various policy approaches and positive incentives, but also include forest protection, sustainable forest management, and increasing forest carbon stock as part of its mission. The accurate monitoring and measurement for reductions of carbon emissions are very important steps in the implementation of REDD ＋ programs. However, the universal existence of uncertainty will be likely to affect the reductions of emissions in REDD ＋ programs. The effects of uncertainty on reductions of emissions and stakeholder benefits of REDD ＋ programs are analyzed through dynamic game models and the simulation research in this paper. The results show that uncertainty increases the reduction of carbon emissions to compensate the underestimate caused by uncertainty. Meanwhile, the increase of uncertainty leads to the growth of compensation price for reduction of carbon emissions. As the uncertainty only affects the subsidies for agents rather than the subsidies for developers, it is more effective to provide subsidies for developers to promote the increase in stakeholders＇ profits. Meanwhile, this effect are more obvious when the uncertainty is greater. Therefore, the best choice of policy makers should be providing subsidies for developers rather than agents in the future. REDD ＋ programs can not only bring benefits for developers and landholders, but also improve the environmental and ecological welfare of the whole society. External benefits, however, have not been fully reflected in the price of ＂carbon credits. ＂ As economic incentives are created by national governments in lieu of external benefits, attention needs to be paid to ensure that distribution is as fair as possible. Therefore, policy makers should give priority to the establishment of a fair and effective incentive mechanism based on the developer subsidies. Meanwhile, in order to ensure that incentives be used solely for REDD programs and responsibly utilized for their intended purpose, the administrators and national governments of REDD ＋ programs should establish mechanisms for financial governance which meet international standards to reduce losses from corruption and fraud and promote the successfully implementation of REDD ＋ programs