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基于纳什议价的P2P社会网络资源共享

Nash bargaining based resource sharing in P2P social networks
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摘要 针对peer-to-peer(P2P)社会网络中存在的自由下载问题,提出了一种基于纳什议价的节点资源共享博弈。将节点共享资源分为公共品资源和俱乐部资源两类;将社会网络中的节点关系集合分为朋友集合(FS)和普通集合(SS)。节点在FS中共享的资源作为公共品资源,在SS中的作为俱乐部资源。采用纳什议价的方法证明存在节点共享能力、保证不同集合中节点共享资源的最小服务质量以及最大化节点共享资源效用函数的条件下,共享资源节点根据纳什议价权力对不同集合进行资源共享,达到最优的资源共享,并分析了基于纳什议价节点共享资源的公平性。通过仿真验证表明,节点共享资源的收益和资源共享量与不同集合议价权力都正相关,保证最小服务质量的资源共享其公平性因子高于不存在服务质量保证的资源共享公平性因子。仿真结果验证了理论分析结果。 To effectively overcome the free-rider problems which existed in the peer-to-peer(P2P) social networks ,this paper presented resource sharing based on the Nash bargaining. Firstly,it divided the peers' sharing resources into the public goods (PGs) and the club goods(CGs) ,and divided the relationship sets between the P2P social network peers into friends set(FS) and stranger set(SS). Peers' sharing resources in the FS regarded as the PGs,in the SS regarded as the CGs. Secondly, this paper used the method o'f the Nash bargaining to prove peers achieved the optimal resource sharing within peers sharing capa- bility,the peers' minimum quality of service (QoS) and the maximum of utility function, according to the Nash bargaining power to share their resources in different sets. Again,it analysed the fairness of peers' resources sharing based on Nash bar- gaining power. Finally, simulation shows that the utility function of peers' resource sharing and the number of resource sharing peer are positively related to the Nash bargaining power, the fairness of resource sharing guaranteeing minimum QoS is higher than that no guaranteeing QoS. The theoretical analysis is validated by the simulation results.
出处 《计算机应用研究》 CSCD 北大核心 2016年第7期2096-2101,共6页 Application Research of Computers
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(61001084)
关键词 对等网络 博弈论 资源共享 纳什议价 社会网络 P2P game theory resource sharing Nash bargaining social networks
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参考文献16

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