不同市场结构下政府的最优补贴率及其对企业R&D行为的影响

Government Optimal Subsidy Rate under Different Market Structure and its Impact on Corporate R&D Behavior

技术创新的溢出效应致使企业的R&D投入低于期望的最优水平,政府应对其进行补贴,但是在不同的市场结构下企业之间的竞争态势存在明显差异,政府应制定差别化的最优补贴率,并引导企业在R&D竞争或R&D合作中作出正确的选择。主要采用博弈论的方法,以企业数量的多少来衡量市场结构的差异,着重考察4种不同市场结构下政府的最优补贴率及其对企业研发行为的影响。研究发现:(1)在完全竞争的市场结构下,政府的最优补贴率为1,不管企业之间的研发方式如何(R&D竞争或R&D合作),都不会对最终的研发投入水平产生任何影响;而在完全垄断的市场结构下,政府的最优补贴率为0.33,由于市场上仅有1家企业,因此不存在R&D竞争或R&D合作的选择问题。(2)在寡头垄断和垄断竞争的市场结构下,政府的最优补贴率应随企业数量的增加、溢出效应的增大而增大,即竞争越激烈、溢出效应越高,政府越应提高补贴率;而企业之间的研发方式选择主要与溢出效应有关,若溢出效应小于0.5,则企业应选择R&D竞争;若溢出效应大于0.5,则企业应进行R&D合作;若溢出效应等于0.5,则两种研发方式不存在明显差异。

Due to technology innovation Is spillover effect, R＆D investment is below the optimal level of expectations. Therefore, the government should be subsidized, but there are significant differences during the different market structures. The government should develop differentiated optimal subsidy rates and guide enterprises to make the right choice between R＆D competition and R＆D cooperation. This paper uses game theory and measures the difference of market structures with the number of enterprises. The study focuses on the optimal government subsidy rate under four different market structures and its impact on corporate R＆D behaviors. The study finds out： （ 1 ） In the perfectly competitive market structure, the op- timal government subsidy rate is 1. No matter which way enterprises choose to carry out research and development （ R＆D competition or R＆D cooperation）, the final level of R＆D investment keeps the same. And in complete monopoly market structure, the optimal government subsidy rate is 0.33. Since only one company exists in the market, so there is no choice between R＆D competition and R＆D cooperation. （2） In oligopolistic and monopolistic competition market structure, the optimal government subsidy rate should increase with the number of enterprises and spillover effect. The more intense the competition, the higher the spillover effects, and the government subsidy rate should be larger. The R＆D approach between enterprises mainly depends on spillover effects. If the spillover effect is less than 0. 5, the enterprise should choose R＆D competition ; if the spillover effect is greater than 0. 5, the enterprise should be R＆D cooperation ; if the spillover effect is equal to 0.5, then the two R＆D ways have no significant difference.