从计划销售量的确定看一类委托-代理问题

A Typical Problem of Principal-Agent Theory

本文通过对现行汽车销售网络中计划销售量确定方法的分析 ,指出由于信息的不对称以及“棘轮效应”的存在 ,销售总公司与分销中心在确定计划销售量时 ,必然会陷入“骑马比慢”的困境。而打破这一困境的有效方法便是“换马” ,即两者互换角色 ,并通过适当的激励手段 。

An incentive mechanism is designed to resolve the dilemma, which results from asymmetric information and ratchet effect, in the process of deciding planning sales number. The author also brings forward a new method to get more accurate planning sales number in this paper.