闭环供应链委托代理激励机制设计研究

Research on Incentive Mechanism Design based on Principal- Agent in Closed- Loop Supply Chain

当制造商和零售商之间同时存在销售和回收关系时,存在按照销售、回收活动各自单独激励与按照总收益整体激励两种契约类型,本文在信息对称与不对称两种情形下对这两种类型契约的激励机制差异进行研究,结果发现:在信息对称情形下,两种契约类型的均衡结果完全一致;在信息不对称情形下,对零售商而言,无论采取哪一种契约类型,其分成比例均更高,承担的风险也更大,但对制造商而言,按照销售、回收活动各自收益单独激励契约类型更优;从风险规避的角度看,在信息不对称情形下,制造商的确定性等价收益随零售商/制造商风险规避程度的增加而递减,零售商的确定性等价收益保持不变,但努力程度、销售量、回收量随制造商风险规避程度的增加而递增,随零售商风险规避程度的增加而递减,期望收益与制造商的期望收益呈反方向变化,进而导致供应链整体期望收益变化方向不确定。

When there exist sales and recycling relationships between the manufacturer and the retailer,two different types of contract are proposed： one is based on the respective revenue of sale and recycle,the other is based on the total revenue. The differences between the two incentive mechanisms with information symmetry and asymmetry are discussed respectively,finding the equilibrium results of the two contract types are in complete agreement under the condition of information symmetry; in the case of asymmetric information,no matter what type of contract the retailer takes,his share proportion is higher,and the risk is greater,but for manufacturers,in accordance with respective revenue of sale and recycle contract type is better; from the perspective of risk aversion,the manufacturer＇s certainty equivalent income decreases with the increase of the retailer / manufacturer risk aversion degree in the case of asymmetric information,the retailer＇s certainty equivalence income remains unchanged,but the effort level,sales volume and recovery rate increase with the increase of the manufacturer＇s risk aversion degree,and decrease with increasing retailer risk aversion degree; expected return and the expected return of the manufacturer is in the opposite direction,which leads to the uncertainty of the expected return of the whole supply chain.