职务发明奖酬管制的理论困境与现实出路

Theoretical Predicament and Realistic Tactics of the Rewarding System for On-duty Inventions

智力活动难以监督,导致职务发明的代理成本高昂。该问题有时只能通过让发明人参与剩余价值分配予以解决。这是职务发明利益分配不同于其他雇佣劳动成果的原因,它限定了职务发明奖酬制度的适用范围。如果奖酬激发的额外创新尚不足以弥补制度成本,强推奖酬无异于将手段异化为目的并用权利话语取代理性分析。当分离单项发明贡献的难度增大时,创新机制应更多依赖单位优势,允许以笼统定价取代单次定价、以科层结构替代价格机制。创新社会化趋势正在挑战每项发明奖酬与贡献相符的原则。将该原则强化为系统性管制更是严重缺乏正当性。即使要细化管制,但至少应从主体类别、客体范围和审查模式三方面限定管制范围。

The agency cost for on-duty invention is high due to the difficulty in supervision over intellectual activities. The issue sometimes can be solved only by allowing the inventors to participate in the surplus value distribution. It is not only the reason to rightly differentiate the benefits distribution of the on-duty invention from that of other fruits of labor, it also restrict the application scope of the rewarding system for on-duty inventions. If an extra innovation that is motivated by the reward cannot make up the institutional cost, forcibly implementing the reward system is just change the method into target and replace reasonable analysis with rights-talk. When separating contribution within a single invention becomes increasingly difficult, innovative mechanism shall rely heavier on unit advantage, and single pricing shall be replaced with the general pricing, and the price mechanism shall be replaced with hierarchy structure. Innovation socialization is challenging the principle that each invention reward shall be in conformity with contribution, and intensifying this principle as the systematic surveillance seriously lacks justification. Taking a step back, even the surveillance and regulation need to be concretized, and the scope of surveillance should be limited at least from the aspects of subject category, object scope and review model.