摘要
阿奎那关于个别感觉与普遍理性表征的理论是其对理智之非物质性论证的关键部分,但这一理论受到司各特、奥卡姆及布里丹等后来者的批评。然而,这些批评其实都不能成立。阿奎那的论证并不像罗伯特·帕斯纳奥对他的诘难中所说的那样,犯了从一个表征的语义内容推出此表征之本体论属性的"内容谬误"。此外,由布里丹本人的评论可以看出,布里丹实际上不得不接受他所批评的阿奎那论证所蕴含的主要内容。
Aquinas' account of singular sensory and universal intellectual representation is crucialin one of his main arguments for the immateriality of the intellect. However,it had beenchallenged by Scotus,Ockham and Buridan.I argue that their objections to Aquinas' account areuntenable.I also show that,contrary to what Robert Pasnau claims,Aquinas' argument does nothave to commit ″the content fallacy.″ Finally,I explain why Buridan has to accept the mainimplication of Aquinas' argument,even though he actually rejects that implication.
出处
《浙江大学学报(人文社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第3期61-68,共8页
Journal of Zhejiang University:Humanities and Social Sciences
关键词
阿奎那
语义学
心灵哲学
个别感觉
普遍理性
非物质性
Aquinas
semantics
philosophy of mind
singular sensory
universal intellect
immateriality