企业融资约束、退出与资源误配

Credit Constraints,Exit and Resources Misallocation

在理论模型分析的基础上,得出融资约束通过两个渠道增加企业的退出风险:一是流动性约束;二是使用外部资金需要支付融资成本,这会提高企业退出的临界生产率,从而提高企业的退出风险。信贷市场效率的提高使得企业融资成本降低,迫使低生产率企业退出市场。进一步,使用中国工业企业数据进行的实证检验表明:融资约束确实增加了企业的退出风险;随着融资约束程度的增加,企业的退出风险加速递增;信贷市场效率的提高增加了低生产率企业的退出风险,随着生产率的上升,企业的退出风险显著下降。因此,信贷市场效率提高会优化经济中的资源配置。

By building a theoretical model,the paper argues credit constraints increases the risk of exit in tw o w ays. One is liquidity constraints and the other is financing cost w hich w ill enhance the critical productivity of exit,and thus increasing the risk of exit. Improvement of efficiency of financial market w ill reduce financing cost,thereby,force low productivity firms to exit. An empirical investigation is provided w ith Chinese industrial firm- level data. The results are as follow s：（ 1） Credit constraints really increase the risk of exit;（ 2） The risk of exit increases accelerately w ith the enhancing of credit constraints;（ 3） Increasing of financial market efficiency enhances the exit hazard of low productivity enterprises. How ever,w ith productivity increasing,the exit risk declines significantly. So to enhance financial market efficiency w ill promote the efficiency of resource allocation.