摘要
以2007—2012年沪深A股上市家族企业为研究样本,考虑外部制度环境的调节作用,实证检验家族控制权结构对企业过度投资的影响。研究发现:家族股东持股比例与过度投资呈倒U型关系,关联股东持股比例、董事会和经理层家族超额控制与过度投资呈负相关关系;市场竞争程度和区域市场化水平对家族股东持股比例、经理层家族超额控制与过度投资的关系具有显著的负向调节作用,对关联股东持股比例、董事会家族超额控制与过度投资的关系无显著调节作用。
Using data of listed family businesses in China from 2007- 2012 as samples and considering the moderating effects of external institutional environment,this paper tests w hether family control structure affects corporate over- investment. The result show s that an inverse- U- shaped relationship betw een the share- holding of family shareholders and corporate over- investment could exist,w hile the share- holding of related shareholders and family excess control of board or management is negatively correlated w ith corporate over- investment. M arket competition degree and regional marketization level have moderating role betw een the share- holding of family shareholders or family excess control of management and corporate over- investment,but have no moderating role betw een the share- holding of related shareholders or family excess control of board and corporate over- investment.
出处
《财贸研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第3期138-147,共10页
Finance and Trade Research
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"基于双重委托代理理论模型构建的股权集中型公司治理最优化研究"(70502024)
教育部新世纪优秀人才支持计划项目(NCET-11-0412)
关键词
家族超额控制
家族所有权控制
过度投资
外部制度环境
family excess control
family ow nership control
over-investment
external institutional environment
