防范中国地方政府债务风险的制度思考-基于“权、责、利”关系的分析

The Institutional Thoughts on Preventing Local Government Debt Risks in China: An Analysis Based on the Relationship between "Power, Responsibility and Interest"

从变化趋势来看,如果不对我国地方政府债务规模进行有效控制,债务风险将危在旦夕;从区域分布来看,除北京、上海、天津和海南外,我国地方政府债务风险主要集中在西部地区。进一步分析发现,地方政府债务风险表现为"权、责、利"关系失衡,包括债务权力缺失、债务责任不清和债务利益扭曲。纠正这种失衡的核心是防止地方政府债务私人利益侵蚀,实现地方政府债务行为"忠诚"地为公共利益服务。为此,抓住债务"权、责、利"关系是构建我国地方政府债务风险防治体系的关键,具体包括:一是确定赋予地方政府债务权力的时机;二是基于积极和消极两方面设计地方政府债务责任约束体系,解决新增债务、无效债务和逾期债务膨胀问题;三是提出实现地方政府个人利益向社会利益收敛的引导机制。

According to the trend, if we don′t implement effectively control to the scales of local government debt in China, the debt risks will be on the verge of destruction. Viewing from regional distributions, in addition to Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin and Hainan, the local government debt risks in China are mainly concentrated in western regions. Further analysis show that local government debt risks embodied as the imbalanced relationship between 'power, responsibility and interest', including the lack of debt power, the unclear of debt responsibility and the distortion of debt interest. To correct this imbalance, the core is to prevent local government debt from eroding private interests, to achieve the local government debt behavior, and to serve the public interest 'loyally'. Therefore, grabbing the relationship between 'power, responsibility and interest' on debt is the key to build the prevention system of local government debt risks in China, specifically including: one is to determine the timing of granting the local government debt power; in the second, place, the constraint system of local government debt responsibility should be reasonably designed concerning the positive and negative aspects to solve the expansion problem of new debt, invalid debt and overdue debt;Thirdly, the leading mechanism to achieve the personal interests of local government converging to the society interest should be proposed.