双边信息不对称下供应链契约研究

Supply chain contract with double sided asymmetric information

为了解决双边信息不对称下供应链的契约制定问题,在由一个具有私人生产成本信息的生产商和一个具有私人市场信息的销售商组成的供应链上,考虑引入不占有利润的利他委托人作为系统的委托人,建立双边信息不对称的激励模型。通过激励模型的求解得出能够同时揭示制造商与销售商私人信息的订购量与转移支付组合。将转移支付的形式具体化,给出了对应的批发价格契约以及销售奖惩契约的具体参数形式。研究发现,双边不对称信息下供应链契约制定的关键在于权衡双边的信息优势,销售奖惩契约能很好地适用。最后通过数值算例验证了相关结论的有效性。

To solve the contracts of supply chain with double sided asymmetric information,on a supply chain consisted of one manufacturer with private information-marginal manufacturing cost and one retailer with private information-market demand,an incentive model with double sided asymmetric information was constructed by introducing a non-profit third party.Through solving the incentive model,a combination of transfer payment and trading quantity was obtained.To make the transfer payment specific,the wholesales contract and the sales rebate contract were provided.The research showed that the sales rebate contract could balance the information advantage of manufacturer and retailer,which was the key problem to set out the contract in supply chain with double sided asymmetric information.A numerical example was presented to explain the main ideas.