摘要
劳动治理型企业有悠久的历史,但对这类企业的经济学研究却一直处于某种边缘状态。目前,学术界围绕这类企业展开研究的一个重要议题是劳动治理型企业稀少的成因。已有的文献试图从劳动治理型企业治理绩效低下的角度说明稀少的成因,其理论视角包括激励与监督机制、投资、融资、资产组合、交易成本、集体决策成本以及成员资格市场等方面,但这些低效论均存在一定的缺陷。本文摒弃"稀少源于治理绩效低"的论证思路,认为劳动治理型企业制度治理高效可以与稀少现象同时并存。治理高效是因为横向激励监督机制形成,稀少现象是由于"劣币驱逐良币"造成的。
Labor management type enterprise has a long history but the economic research on this kind of enterprise has been marginalized.One of the important topics in the academic field is the cause of the scarcity of labor management enterprises.In this paper,we reject the idea of"scarcity originated from the low management performance"and point out that the high efficiency of labor management type enterprise can coexist with the scarcity phenomenon.Management efficiency is due to the formation of transverse incentive supervision mechanism while the scarcity phenomenon is caused by"bad money driving out good money".
出处
《教学与研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第6期35-42,共8页
Teaching and Research
基金
国家社科基金重大项目"贯彻科学发展观
构建社会主义和谐社会的微观基础研究"(项目号:07&ZD003)
四川大学"985工程"三期资助
关键词
劳动治理型企业
治理绩效
劣币驱逐良币
labor management type enterprise
management performance
bad money drives out good money