摘要
异质的股东资源可能在公司治理中扮演了不同角色,而内部权力配置对股东资源与企业战略的耦合具有重要影响。以企业的对外直接投资活动作为国际化战略的测度,通过整合"资源基础理论"与"代理理论",本文研究了股东资源以及CEO权力对企业国际化战略的影响。实证研究发现:国有股东相比于民营股东在企业国际化战略上趋于保守,国内机构投资者和外资股东对企业实施国际化战略发挥了积极作用。CEO权力能够对上述关系产生如下调节效应:一方面,CEO权力的增强可能降低了机构投资者对企业国际化战略的正面影响;另一方面,强权CEO的存在也可能有助于提升国有股东的国际化意愿,并进一步强化外资股东对企业国际化战略的积极态度。
It is widely known that shareholders owning varied resources play different roles in corporate governance, while internal power configuration exerts a great impact on the coupling between shareholders' resources and corporate strategy. This paper, choosing outward foreign direct investment as a measure of corporate internationalization strategy and combining the "resource-based theory" with the "agency theory", conducts a research into the effect of shareholders' resources and power of CEOs upon corporate internationalization strategy.An empirical study shows that, compared with private shareholders, state-owned shareholders tend to be more conservative in their approach towards corporate internationalization, which, meanwhile, is enormously enhanced by domestic institutional investors and foreign shareholders. Furthermore, CEOs' power exerts a moderating effect on the relationship mentioned above: on the one hand, the enhancing of CEOs' power may reduce the positive impact of institutional investors on corporate internationalization; on the other hand, enhanced power of CEOs may also encourage state-owned shareholders to consider internationalization and further create a positive attitude in foreign shareholders towards internationalization strategies.
基金
国家自然科学基金青年项目(71402109)
国家社会科学基金项目(10XGL004)
重庆市社会科学规划项目(2012QNGL054)
重庆市教委科学技术研究项目(KJ131002)的资助