公司并购、盈余管理与高管薪酬变动

Corporate M&A,Earnings Management and Changes of Executive Compensation

基于前人关于上市公司盈余管理影响因素的研究,本文分析了主并方公司并购收益与并购完成后公司盈余管理之间的关系,以及两者对高管货币性薪酬变动的相互作用机制。本文以2007至2012年我国沪深两市发生重大并购的A股上市公司为研究对象,结果发现:在并购完成后,并购收益与公司盈余管理存在负相关关系,即并购收益越低,公司在并购完成后第一、二年进行正向盈余管理的程度越高;盈余管理与并购收益对高管薪酬的变动存在着相互替代的关系,即并购收益越低,盈余管理对促进高管薪酬增长的影响越大。本文的研究丰富了盈余管理和公司并购的理论内涵,并为监管部门以及投资者的决策提供了重要的经验证据。

In this paper,we research that how the M&A income affects earnings management and how earnings management and M&A income work on the changes of executive compensation in the post-M&A period,according to the previous researches on factors of affecting earnings management. We take China's listed companies from 2007 to 2012 as the sample and results show that there is a negative correlation between M&A income and earnings management,the lower the M&A income is,the greater the acquirers manage their financial results in the post-M&A period. And the relationship between earnings management and M&A income which works on changes of executive compensation is alternative. The lower the M&A income is,the more the earnings management works on growth of executive compensation. The conclusions of this paper rich the theoretical connotation about earnings management and M&A,at the same time,we support important empirical evidence for regulatory authorities and investors' decisions.