摘要
判断聚合理论的核心问题是如何摆脱"不可能性"困境,而"不可能性"困境的标志是包括投票悖论在内的衍申困境。衍申困境直接破坏了基于多数投票规则的集体选择的逻辑合理性,从而向多数投票规则的民主性提出了挑战。为了挽救集体选择的逻辑合理性,判断聚合理论不得不对多数投票规则加以限制甚至摒弃,同时力求避免向独裁规则退化。换言之,该理论在保留判断聚合的逻辑合理性的前提下,尽可能少地丧失聚合规则的民主性。然而,这一努力的结果却是难以令人满意的。
The core problem of theory of judgment aggregation is how to avoid the dilemma of impossibility, and the mark of the impossibility is the discursive dilemma which includes the voting paradox. The discursive dilemma destroys directly the logical rationality of collective choice that is based on the majority voting rule, therefore it makes a challenge to the democracy of majority voting rule. For saving the logical rationality of collective choice, theory of judgment aggregation has to place some restrictions on, even abandon, the majority voting rule, meanwhile tries to avoid degenerating towards the dictatorship rule ;or other, the theory tries to reduce the loss of democracy of aggregation rules as far as possible, presupposes that the logical rationality of collective choice can be retained. However, the result of this effort is not satisfactory.
出处
《河北学刊》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第4期8-18,共11页
Hebei Academic Journal
基金
2015年度国家社会科学基金重大项目<现代归纳逻辑的新发展
理论前沿与应用研究>(15ZDB018)
2013年度中国逻辑学会学术研究重点项目<对塔斯基"真"理论的批评与重建>(13CLZD001)
关键词
判断聚合
社会选择
衍申困境
不可能性定理
集体合理性
judgment aggregation
Social Choice
discursive dilemma
impossibility theorem
collective rationality