自然主义方法在哲学层面所忽略的维度——从对胡塞尔“内时间意识”的分析出发

On the Dimension Ignored Philosophically by the Approach of Naturalism——Discussion Starting from Husserl's Analysis of Consciousness of Internal Time

从直观看来,采用自然主义态度或方法的哲学论证往往很有说服力。然而,它们大多预设了一个前提,即所谈论的"概念"与"事实"同构,这一点在休谟哲学中得到了明显体现。而胡塞尔的内时间意识理论表明,"第一人称视角"(First-person perspective)比"第三人称视角"(Third-person perspective)更为本原,正是通过"内时间意识",客观时间的基础才得以奠定。又因为在一定程度上内时间意识结构与人的本真体验结构同构,所以自然主义态度或方法所预设的"概念"与"事实"同构的前提似乎并不能成立,而仅是"隔靴搔痒"。可见,哲学与自然主义的实证科学所关注的是两个不同的维度,自然主义方法在哲学层面的运用不可避免地忽略了原初时间意向维度及原初知觉维度。

Generally speaking, the philosophical arguments adopting the attitude or approach of Naturalism often seem to be convincing. While they in most cases presuppose a premise, that is,the ＂concepts＂ deployed by Naturalism are isomorphic with the ＂facts＂, which is obvious in David Hume＇ s philosophy. However, Husserl＇ s theory of the consciousness of internal time shows that the first - person perspective is more original than the third - person perspective, and it is through ＂the consciousness of internal time＂ that the basis of objective time can be established. Moreover, the structure of consciousness of internal time is isomorphic with the structure of humans＇ authentic experience to some degree. Thus, the premise presupposed by the attitude or approach of Naturalism seems to be inconsistent. Evidently, the focus of philosophy is different with that of positive science, and deploying the approach of Naturalism philosophically ignores the dimension of original intention of time and the dimension of original perception.