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Resource Allocation for Network Security Risk Assessment:A Non-Cooperative Differential Game Based Approach 被引量:1

Resource Allocation for Network Security Risk Assessment:A Non-Cooperative Differential Game Based Approach
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摘要 In this paper, we propose a non-cooperative differential game theory based resource allocation approach for the network security risk assessment. For the risk assessment, the resource will be used for risk assess, including response cost and response negative cost. The whole assessment process is considered as a differential game for optimal resource control. The proposed scheme can be obtained through the Nash Equilibrium. It is proved that the game theory based algorithm is applicable and the optimal resource level can be achieved based on the proposed algorithm. In this paper, we propose a non-cooperative differential game theory based resource allocation approach for the network security risk assessment. For the risk assessment, the resource will be used for risk assess, including response cost and response negative cost. The whole assessment process is considered as a differential game for optimal resource control. The proposed scheme can be obtained through the Nash Equilibrium. It is proved that the game theory based algorithm is applicable and the optimal resource level can be achieved based on the proposed algorithm.
出处 《China Communications》 SCIE CSCD 2016年第4期131-135,共5页 中国通信(英文版)
基金 supported by the China Postdoctoral Science Foundation(No.2015M570936) National Science Foundation Project of P.R.China(No.61501026,61272506) Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities(No.FRF-TP-15032A1)
关键词 resource allocation security risk assessment differential game NON-COOPERATIVE Nash Equilibrium resource allocation security riskassessment differential game non-coopera-tive Nash Equilibrium
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