摘要
在组织生产时,如果生产行为没有任何外部性,应当优先采用自主经营的市场制度,因为这种制度下企业生产规模的自发均衡点最优,无需管理成本。在生产行为有正外部性时,会导致企业生产规模的自发均衡点偏小,达不到最优生产规模。然而,补贴制度可以使具有正外部性的生产规模自发地扩大。在生产行为有负外部性时,会导致企业生产规模的自发均衡点偏大,从而造成资源枯竭。然而,税收制度可以使负外部性生产的规模自发地缩小,从而减轻对资源的消耗。对于社会中常见的竞争行为,竞争最为激烈的情况是只有两个单位参与竞争的情况,而不是人们平时所认为的竞争参与者越多竞争就越激烈。这说明,为了治理恶意打压对手等恶性竞争行为,允许更多的企业进入市场是有效方法,而不是人们通常所认为的设法减少竞争参与者。就最基础的理论来说,本文提出的一个重要观点,是任何行为的发生都必须同时具备三个必要条件:正的行为效用、行为资源、行为机会。显然,这与传统的经济学理论中只关注行为效用的区别是巨大的。
It is also been discovered that if a production behavior does not produce any externalities, market institutions featuring in- dependent operation should be prioritized ahead of other models as the production scale will reach spontaneous optimal e- quilibrium. Where there are positive externalities from production, the spontaneous equilibrium of the production scale will get lower from optimization. The subsidy mechanism can lead to the spontaneous growth of production scale. Where there are negative externalities from production, the spontaneous equilibrium of the production scale will get higher from opti- mization. Tax mechanisms can be used to shrink the production scale. As for competitive behavior, the finding is: the fiercest competition takes place when there are only two units competing with each other rather than the more crowded the field is, the fiercer the competition will be. Finally, the three conditions necessary for behavior are proposed: utility, re- sources and opportunity. Obviously, there is a great difference from the only concern on behavior and utility in the tradi- tional economics.
出处
《企业经济》
北大核心
2016年第6期5-10,共6页
Enterprise Economy
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"行为管理制度漏洞治理设计的工程化方法研究"(项目编号:71171134)
上海市一流学科建设项目"管理科学与工程"(项目编号:S1201YLXK)
上海市高原学科建设项目"管理科学与工程"(项目编号:GYXK1201)
关键词
制度经济学
制度设计
行为管理
制度结构
institution economics
institutional design
behavior management
institutional structure