信息不对称下众筹平台发展策略的信号博弈分析

伴着互联网金融在我国的迅速发展,众筹融资作为一种创新的融资模式步入快速发展的轨道。众筹融资给许多创意型企业搭建了融资平台,但也催生出诸多风险。在众筹平台上申请融资的项目发起人提供的产品项目质量往往良莠不齐,众筹平台并不能完全鉴别出来。因此,筹资人与众筹平台之间存在着严重的信息不对称问题,不仅会间接地损害投资人利益,影响平台信誉,也不利于众筹产业的良性发展。要改善上述问题,须加强众筹平台对筹资人发起的产品项目的甄别、审核、监管功能。因此,本文选取众筹模式中较为普遍的奖励式众筹,针对项目发起人与众筹平台之间存在的信息不对称问题,建立了信号博弈模型,并深入分析了三种贝叶斯均衡,为众筹平台完善自身功能,持续稳定发展提供了政策建议。

With the rapid development of internet finance in China, crowdfunding, which is a new-style financial vehicle, has entered the track of rapid development. Crowdfunding builds a financing platform for many creative companies, but also causes a number of risks. Crowdfunding platform can＇t identify all the product qualities provided by project sponsors, and therefore, there is a serious problem of information asymmetry between project sponsors and crowdfunding platform. Not only does this problem indirectly damage the interests of investors and the platform credibility, but it is unfavorable to the crowd- funding industry＇s healthy development. To improve the above problems, it＇s necessary for erowfunding platform to strengthen the function of discrimination and supervision. Therefore, according to the problem of asymmetric information between the project sponsors and the erowdfunding platform, this article selects a common type of cro^dfunding and estab- lishes the signal game model to analyze the three kinds of bayesian equilibrium. At last, the article pats forward some poli- cy recommendations for platform＇s continuous and stable development.