管理者过度自信、非效率投资和成本粘性

Managerial overconfidence,inefficient investment and cost stickiness

运用2011—2014年我国A股上市公司数据,实证检验管理者过度自信对成本粘性的影响,并尝试从非效率投资角度解释管理者过度自信对成本粘性的影响机理。结果表明,管理者过度自信的公司比非过度自信的公司具有更高的成本粘性,且非效率投资在过度自信对成本粘性的影响中起到部分中介的作用。该研究对规范决策中的管理者过度自信行为,制约企业非效率投资进而降低成本粘性,提高企业的成本管理有效性和经营效率具有现实指导意义。

Using the data of Share A listed companies from 2011 to 2014 in China,the effect of managerial overconfidence on cost stickiness is studied empirically. The mechanism of the influence of managerial overconfidence on cost stickiness is being interpreted from perspective of inefficient investment. The result show s that the company with managerial overconfidence has higher cost stickiness comparing with the company without managerial overconfidence,and inefficient investment is partly playing an intermediary role in the effect of overconfidence on cost stickiness. The research has a practical guiding significance in regulating the behavior of managerial overconfidence in decision-making, restricting the inefficient investment of company and reducing the cost stickiness,and improving the cost management efficiency and operating efficiency of company.