信息不对称条件下住房反向抵押贷款养老的博弈分析

Game Analysis of Housing Reverse Mortgage Endowment under the Condition of Asymmetric information

住房反向抵押贷款养老业务能否成功实施,解决业务办理过程中的信息不对称是关键。运用完全理性人假设,通过构建动态博弈模型求解精炼贝叶斯均衡,探讨不完全信息动态博弈过程中各参与主体的策略选择行为,分析老年人健康状况信息的不对称给住房反向抵押贷款养老业务的实施造成的影响,并引入约束机制和博弈周期以改变博弈双方的某些行为,改进博弈过程,从而达到总体效用最优,并提出完善信息管理系统、提高造假成本、改变博弈的顺序、制定优惠政策等四个对策。

Whether the Housing reverses mortgage endowment business can be successfully implemented or not, is decided by the efforts to solve the information asymmetry in the business process. This paper attempts to use completely rational person hypothesis, by building a dynamic game model to find the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, and explores the strategy choice behavior of game participators in the incomplete information dy-namic game, analyzes the effect of the asymmetric information of the elderly on the implementation of the hous-ing reverse mortgage endowment service, and introduces the constraint mechanism and the game cycle to change some of the actions of game participators, improves the game process, so as to achieve the maximiza-tion of the overall utility. We put forward relevant countermeasures from information management, cost, game orders and public policy etc.