意向性在现象学中的嬗变及其意义

The evolution of intentionality theory in phenomenology and its significance

意向性概念从诞生起几乎贯穿了整个现象学运动发展的始终,是哲学认识论中无法回避的核心理论。意向性概念由布伦坦诺提出,经由胡塞尔、海德格尔和萨特的批判和改造,在其概念的内涵上发生了诸多深刻的变化。文章通过梳理这一变化,进一步明晰意向性概念在现象学中的哲学意义。

Since the rising of intentionality, it is almost throughout the development of the phenomenological movement, which becomes the core of the epistemological philosophy theory and is unable to avoid. The intentionality concept was put forward by Franz Brentano, then was criticized and transformed by Husserl,Heidegger and Sartre. Therefore, its connotation had much profound changes. This paper tries to analyze these changes and clarify the sigintentional concept tentional concept in the phenomenological philosophy.