官员更替、政府管制与企业贿赂

Governor Turnover,Government Regulation and Bribery

推动腐败的有效治理是中国经济转型过程中亟待解决的重大现实问题之一。从官员治理的角度出发,利用第三方权威机构提供的关于中国制造业企业的调查数据,旨在从实证的视角分析和评估官员更替和政府管制对企业贿赂行为的影响效应。研究结果表明,当年官员更替触发的权力转移和交接会强化企业的贿赂行为,同样地,伴随着政府管制的增加,企业的贿赂行为也会越来越强烈。进一步地,随着当年官员更替程度的增加,由政府管制所引发的企业贿赂行为也会越来越严重。不过,随着权力转移和交接的逐步完成,企业的贿赂行为随之急剧减少,伴随着政府管制所引发的企业贿赂行为也在逐渐收敛。本研究丰富了官员治理与企业腐败行为方面的研究,相关研究结论为深层次理解转轨经济背景下的中国腐败治理之路提供了新的思路。

Promoting effective governance is one of the urgent problems of China's economic transition. From the perspective of provincial governors,and using survey data provided by the World Bank about the institutional quality of Chinese manufacturing enterprise operations,this paper analyses and evaluates the effects of governor turnover and government regulation on company bribes. The results show a company's bribery behaviors will increase when political power is transferred from the departing governor to the new governor. Similarly,a company will need to pay more bribes in order to cope with government regulation. Furthermore,government regulation will increase bribery behaviors if governors are appointed more frequently. However,once political power is transferred,bribery behaviors will be drastically reduced. This paper provides micro-empirical evidence that is crucial to developing a deeper understanding of corruption in China.