考虑信息泄露的供应链成员决策研究

The Supply Chain Members' Decision-Making Considering Information Leakage

为了分析两个竞争型制造商同时制定批发价格时供应链成员决策,针对具有可替代性的产品,在伯川德竞争下建立了收益共享契约下由一个供应商和两个竞争型制造商组成的基本模型,探讨了信息泄露和不泄露时制造商产品定价决策,分析了批发价格外生和内生时供应商的信息泄露决策.研究表明:批发价格内生时,无论供应商是否泄露市场需求状态信息,产品最优批发价格的设置只与收益分享率和产品的可替代性有关,且最优批发价格随着收益分享率的增大而降低,随着产品替代系数的增大而增大.

In order to study strategies of the supply chain members under price competition when two competing manufacturers make wholesale prices simultaneously, a basic model consisting of one supplier and two competing man- ufacturers is established. The selling products are alternative and subject to Bertrand competition. The different pri- cing strategies of two manufacturers are discussed under the condition of information confidentiality and information leakage. The information leakage decisions of the supplier are analyzed when the wholesale price is exogenous and en- dogenous. The results are as follows., when the wholesale price is endogenous, whether with information leakage or not, the optimal wholesale price is only related to the revenue sharing rate and the substitutability of product. The op- timal wholesale price decreases with the increase of the revenue sharing rate, and increases with the increase of the substitution coefficient of product.