非对称信息下考虑企业社会责任的供应链决策

Supply chain decisions under asymmetric information considering corporate social responsibility

针对由单个制造商和单个零售商组成的两级Stackelberg博弈供应链,文章通过消费者剩余作为其参与企业社会责任(corporate social responsibility,CSR)活动的利润函数,研究了非对称信息下零售商参与CSR和制造商参与CSR活动供应链最优决策。首先,在零售商参与CSR活动下,讨论了市场潜力均值ea和参与CSR活动投入系数对αr零售价、批发价、市场需求量、零售商利润、制造商利润和系统总利润的影响,且分析了在不同的取值范围的市场潜力均值ea下,系统总利润达到最大时活动投入系数α*r最优值。其次,在制造商参与CSR活动下,讨论了市场潜力均值ea和参与CSR活动投入系数αm对以上决策变量的影响,同样考察了在不同的取值范围下的市场潜力均值ea下,系统总利润达到最大时活动投入系数α*m最优值。最后,通过数值仿真验证了以上结论。

The two-stage Stackelberg game supply chain consists of a single manufacturer and a single retailer .Under asymmetric information ,the optimal decisions for the retailer and the manufacturer of supply chain involving in corporate social responsibility （CSR） activities are studied ,which introduce consumer surplus as a profit function of their participation .Firstly ,the effect of the market potential mean ea and the activity input coefficients αr on the retail price ,the wholesale price ,the market de-mand ,the retailer is profit ,the manufacturer profit and system total profit is discussed as the retailer is involved in CSR activities .Moreover ,the optimal activity input coefficient αr for the biggest system＊total profit is analyzed at different range of the market potential mean ea .Then as the manufacturer is involved in CSR activities ,the effect of the market potential mean ea and the CSR activity input coeffi-cient αm on the decision variables above is investigated .The optimal activity input coefficient αm for the＊biggest system total profit is also analyzed at different range of the market potential mean ea .Finally , the conclusions are verified by graphical simulations .