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双层委托—代理视角下的铁路信息技术服务外包问题

A Study on Rail-IT Service Outsourcing Based on the Double Principal-Agent Structure
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摘要 铁路信息技术外包战略的实施对于我国铁路行业的市场化改革具有独特的推动作用。针对外包过程中参与主体逻辑关系不清晰的问题,本文提出此关系中应包含三个参与主体,即全体铁路乘客、中国铁路总公司和信息技术服务的市场供给者,而它们之间应具有双重委托-代理的逻辑结构,进一步的研究可以得出如下结论:1.在第一层逻辑关系中,由于是全体铁路乘客作为委托人,其身份是分散的,而带有垄断经营特征的中国铁路总公司就会在信息技术服务供给过程中存在道德风险。因此,采取促使中国铁路总公司采用信息技术服务外包战略将是防范其道德风险的有效方法;2.在第二层逻辑关系中,中国铁路总公司针对服务供应商除了要设计对应的薪酬激励机制以外,还需要考虑引入声誉约束机制来防范服务供应商的逆向选择与道德风险问题。 Outsourcing strategy of railway IT has been playing an important role in the market-oriented reform of China railway industry. To clarify the fuzzy relationship between the participants in outsourcing,this article argues for a double logical relationship of principal- agent for the three participants,namely,all the rail passengers,China Railway Corporation,and IT service provider. A few conclusions are drawn based on further analysis. First,at the first level of the logical relationships,the rail passengers' identity is decentralized,and China Railway Corporation,with its monopolistic nature of the business,has a moral hazard in providing IT service. Therefore,IT service outsourcing helps China Railway Corporation prevent the moral hazard. Second,in addition to the salary incentive system,China Railway Corporation should also consider introducing the reputation restriction mechanism to guard against adverse selection and moral hazard of IT service providers.
出处 《北京交通大学学报(社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2016年第3期93-103,共11页 Journal of Beijing Jiaotong University(Social Sciences Edition)
关键词 铁路信息技术服务外包 双重委托-代理 激励约束 rail-IT service outsourcing double principal-agent structure incentive and restriction
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