法定、奖励和惩罚权力对顺从和冲突的影响——基于依赖不对称情境的研究

Effects of Legitimate,Reward and Threat Power on Compliance and Conflict— A Study Based on Asymmetric Dependence

文章以烟草零售商为调查对象,探究了在依赖不对称情境下,强势方法定、奖励和惩罚权力对弱势方顺从和冲突的影响。利用收集的204份烟草零售商样本数据,采用结构方程建模对假设进行检验。实证分析的结果表明:在依赖不对称的情境之下,强势方法定权力的使用会促进弱势方顺从行为并降低渠道冲突;强势方奖励权力的使用会促进弱势方顺从行为,但对渠道冲突的影响不显著;强势方惩罚权力的使用不能促进弱势方顺从,同时会提高渠道冲突的水平;顺从会提高关系绩效,而渠道冲突会降低关系绩效。研究结论丰富和深化了渠道权力研究,同时对企业实践具有重要指导意义。

This paper studies the effects of legitimate,reward and threat power on channel member compliance and channel conflict in the context of asymmetric dependence. Using surveying data from 204 tobacco retailers,it tests the hypotheses by the structural equation modeling method. The empirical results indicate that：under the situation of asymmetric dependence, the use of legitimate power will facilitate channel member compliance and reduce channel conflict;the use of reward power will facilitate channel member compliance,but does not significantly affect channel conflict;the use of threat power will not facilitate channel member compliance and increase channel conflict;channel compliance will increase relationship perfor？mance,but channel conflict will decrease the relationship performance. The research results shed new lights on channel pow？er field as well as provide helpful guidelines on managerial practice.