摘要
作为一项弱组织激励任务,"公共服务供给模式"的讨论大多围绕新公共管理运动和交易成本理论展开,忽视了政府组织中制度安排的影响。通过考察城市管网巡护过程发现:组织任务压力和上级政府问责风险共同塑造了地方政府选择"半科层制半市场化"的模式来提供公共服务,问责风险起着更为基础性的作用;代理人的投机程度和上级政府检查力度的区别性组合塑造了地方政府的问责风险感知。这意味着公共服务供给模式的选择实际上是地方政府面对组织任务压力和上级政府问责风险的一种回应策略,背后的核心机制是压力型体制中的上下级政府间的权责关系,这种权责关系主导了弱组织激励任务的执行过程。
Marketization has become a routine way of public service delivery, but the discussion of motivation about marketization of public service mostly revolves around technology governance,such as transaction-cost, and ignores the influence of organization system arrangement.From the case study of patrolling urban pipeline network,it's found that task pressure and risk of accountability determine the choice of local government both bureaucracy and marketization, furthermore, distinctive combination about the degree of speculation agent and the inspection of upper governments shape the risk awareness of local government ac-countability,which is actually reflect that the choice about bureaucracy or marketization is not only the choice of the application of technology governance,but also a coping strategy of local government form higher risk of government accountability,and the core mechanism is the relations of power and responsibility in the pressure system.
出处
《甘肃行政学院学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第2期35-44,126-127,共10页
Journal of Gansu Administration Institute
基金
国家社科基金青年项目"公共危机管理中地方政府行为取向的动力机制研究"
"政府购买公共服务的公共性流失问题及对策研究"的阶段成果
华侨大学研究生科研创新能力培育计划资助项目