创业家族的共同治理有效还是无效?——基于中国家族上市公司的实证研究

Is Common Control Effective in Entrepreneurial Family Firms?——An Analysis Based on Chinese Publicly Held Family Firms

本文针对那种假定家族成员都是纯粹的、目光短浅的利他主义者,提出了一个家族成员为有限利他主义者的假设。我们的主要观点是,创始人及其家族成员的共同治理是有效的,主要原因在于家族成员是兼顾情感财富与物质财富的积累的有限利他主义者。本文基于中国上市公司的数据所进行的经验研究结果表明,我国创业家族企业大多采取家族共同治理的模式,而不是创业者独自控制股权和(或)管理权的模式;相对于创始人独自控制股权的治理模式,创业家族共同控制股权更为有效;相对于创始人独自控制股权和管理权的治理模式以及创始人控制股权而职业经理人控制管理权的治理模式,创业家族共同控制股权与管理权更为有效。本文的研究表明那些自我雇佣的家族成员并不会简单地采取纯粹利他主义行为,而是有限利他的相对理性行为。

This paper assumes that family members are not purely altruistic and short-sighted,but altruistic only to a certain extent.The main point is that common control by the founder and his family members is effective,because family members are bounded altruists who concern both emotional and material wealth.Based on the data of Chinese public listed companies,our empirical results show that,first,common control is the most widely used control mechanism in Chinese entrepreneurial family firms;second,firms that share ownership among family members are more effective than those owned by the founder alone;third,concerning about ownership and managerial rights together,the sharing of these rights among family members is also more effective than the holding of both the managerial and ownership right by the founder alone or the holding of the ownership right by the founder alone and holding of the managerial right by professional managers.Our results demonstrate that the self-employed family members do not act as pure altruists,but bounded altruists.