董事高管责任保险、公司治理与高管私有收益的研究

A Study on the Relationship among D&O Liability Insurance,Corporate Governance and Private Benefits of Executives

本文探讨了企业引入董事高管责任保险将会对企业高管的私有收益产生何种治理效应,以及不同的公司治理环境又将如何影响董事高管责任保险对高管私有收益的治理效应。研究发现,企业高管有动机通过董事高管责任保险的引入来提升其个人货币性私有收益;与之相反,企业高管非货币性私有收益将会因董事高管责任保险的引入而得到降低。另外,本文进一步研究发现,公司治理水平的改善有助于加强董事高管责任保险对高管货币性私有收益的正向激励效应和非货币性私有收益的负向抑制效应。此外,关于董事高管责任保险对高管货币性和非货币性两部分私有收益所产生的相异治理效应的结果,本文给出了部分解释,研究表明,董事高管责任保险的引入将会使高管非货币性私有收益在一定程度上被货币性私有收益所替代,并且这种替代效应受公司治理水平显著正向影响。

This paper discussed the governance effect on the private benefits of corporate executives with the intro- duction of Directors＇and Officers＇liability insurance, and how different corporate governance environment influenced the governance effect. The results showed that executives were motivated to increase their monetary private benefits through the introduction of D＆O liability insurance. By contrast, the non-monetary private benefits of executives would be suppressed by D＆O liability insurance introduction. Moreover, further study showed that the improvement of corporate governance helped to strengthen the positive incentivizing effect of D＆O insurance on the monetary pri- vate benefits and the negative suppressing effect on the non-monetary private benefits. In addition, part of the expla- nation was given in this paper about the different governance effect of D＆O insurance on monetary and non-monetar- y private benefits. The research showed that the introduction of D＆O insurance would make the non-monetary pri- vate benefits replaced by the monetary private benefits to some extent. And the substitution effect was significantly correlated with the corporate governance level.