医药产学研联盟创新决策、创新危机与利润分配

Innovation Decisions,Perils and Profit Allocation of Pharmaceutical Industry-University-Institute Alliance

以我国医药行业产学研合作创新为现实背景,构建两家相互竞争的制药企业与学研机构的双边纳什议价模型,分析企业的创新价值和议价能力对联盟成员绩效的影响,探讨合作创新对药品价格、企业市场份额、经营绩效和社会福利的影响,研究制药企业创新战略的选择决策及创新对企业可能的危险。通过模型分析,得到如下结论:产学研合作创新能够提高社会总福利,但不一定提高制药企业的绩效和药品的价格;议价能力强的制药企业不一定总是获得高利润,企业最终的利润受到企业自身及竞争者的议价能力、创新价值的共同影响;虽然产品创新能够提高消费者的购买意愿,但盲目跟风创新可能会带来双输的结果。本研究对促进医药行业的产学研合作,提高产学研合作的有效性具有现实意义。

Based on the industry-university-institute cooperation innovation in the pharmaceutical industry, we formulate a bilateral bargaining game between two competing pharmaceutical firms and an institute to analyze impacts of innovation value and bargaining powers on performance of alliance members, and discuss impacts of cooperative innovation on drug prices, pharmaceutical firm＇ s market shares and profits as well as the social welfare. Further, we investigate pharmaceutical firms＇ innovation decisions and probable ＇perils of innovation in the presence of competition and negotiation. The results derived from model solution are as follows： First, innovation can improve the social welfare but does not necessarily enhance drugs＇ price and firms＇ performance. Second, a pharmaceutical firm with higher bargaining power does not necessarily gain higher profit allocation. The final profits of firms and the institute depend on the combined factors. Finally, though cooperative innovation can enhance consumers＇ purchasing willing, ＇it is not always an optimal strategy for pharmaceutical firms and even lead to the lose-lose outcome. In a word, our results provide practical significances for promoting industry- university-institute cooperation and enhancing its effects in the pharmaceutical industry.