客户企业参与下服务外包激励机制设计

Design of Incentive Mechanism for Service Outsourcing Under Client Company Participation

服务外包下,由于客户企业参与程度、服务提供商的努力水平以及专用性资产投入水平都难以让合作双方有效验证,这三种不可验证性风险因素可能引发道德风险,从而降低服务外包的绩效,甚至导致服务外包的失败。为此,本文建立了服务外包下的委托—代理框架,设计了客户企业参与下的服务外包激励机制模型,运用最优化理论分析了客户企业的参与程度以及服务提供商的专用性资产投入水平等因素对激励机制契约设计的影响,并运用数值仿真验证客户企业参与程度和服务提供商专用性资产投入水平对激励系数和服务提供商的努力水平的影响。研究分析表明:在服务外包活动中客户企业更多的投入到合作生产中时,对服务提供商的激励也会增加但是增加的幅度较慢,同时服务提供商付出的努力将会加速的提高;服务提供商投入的专用性资产投入水平越高时,其自身的努力水平也会加速增长,客户企业对其的激励系数也会增长,当专用性资产投入水平达到某一程度时,激励系数增长速度达到最大。

It is difficult for the client participation, as well as the service vendor＇ s effort level and the specific as- sets investment level of cooperation between the two sides to make an effective verification in service outsourcing, which may lead to moral hazard, and reduce the service outsourcing performance, and even lead to the failure of service outsourcing. In view of this, the client＇ s participation degree and the vendor＇ s asset specificity invest- ment level which influence the design of incentive contract are analyzed from the perspective of establishing a service outsourcing principal agent framework and optimization theory, and they have been verified by using nu- merical simulation. The results indicate that, when the client puts more efforts in the service outsourcing cooper- ative production, the client incentive for service vendor will increase but the increase rate is slow, and the serv- ice vendor＇ s efforts will be accelerated to improve ; when vendor＇ s asset specificity investment level is higher, its level of effort will also accelerate and meanwhile, the client will increase the growth of the incentive coefficient. When the specific assets investment level reaches a certain level, the growth rate reaches the maximum incentive coefficient.