摘要
2008年,中国政府针对金融危机推出了总量4万亿的经济刺激政策,这是政策干预经济最典型的一个案例。本文通过一个理论模型提出,在金融危机之前政策扶持对受扶持企业发展有利,中央及地方政府也能够从行业优先发展中获益。但金融危机带来的市场环境恶化,使行业与政府之间存在利益目标不一致的可能,政府基于自身利益最大化的理性决策可能对企业发展不利,进而加重企业盈利困境。实证结果显示,2001.2007年,扶持政策使得企业的ROA大约提高了0.9%~1.2%。金融危机时期,扶持政策给企业的ROA带来了1.0%~1.7%的损害,这种损害程度在随后的时期进一步加强,扩大到1.8%~2.3%。金融危机与政策扶持的共同作用也加剧了产能过剩,使得被扶持行业的产能过剩程度提高了4.6%,但这种影响滞后了3年才被观察到。
In 2008, the Chinese government put forth an economic stimulus package of 586 billion USD to minimize the impact of the global financial crisis. This is considered as one of the most important macroeconomic policy interventions in the past decade. This paper employs this policy intervention as a case study to address the challenge of evaluating the treatment effects with a micro-prospective. Although the industry policy led to a "double-win" situation before 2007, the results indicate that the treated finns failed to present a significantly superior performance compared with the control group during the financial crisis, the influence became even significantly negative after 2010. The policy intervention made the ROA of supported finns increase by 0.9%-1.2% compared to other finns, while the difference reversed to negative 1.0%-1.7% during the financial crisis and ex- panded to 1.8%-2.3% after that. A lagged effect on capacity utilization was observed after 3 years, the excess capacity in- creased by 4.6% for treated industry.
出处
《投资研究》
2016年第4期4-22,共19页
Review of Investment Studies
关键词
金融危机
信贷
企业业绩
Financial crisis, Debt, Firm performance