政治关联影响因素及经济后果的模型分析：基于多任务委托代理模型的视角

The Factors and the Economic Consequences of Political Connection:From the Perspective of Multitask Principal-agent Problem

基于多任务代理模型,研究以理论模型分析和数值模拟的方法考察了外部运行环境变化和经营者道德风险对政治关联经营者、投资者收益以及社会福利的影响。结果表明:1)当外部客观环境变动较高时,经营者更多道德风险行为,反而可以抵消环境变动引起的收益减少。可见转型经济背景下我国企业积极诉求政治关联既是经营者为应对客观环境多变性而采取的措施,也是经营者追求自身利益最大化的结果。而政治关联减缓了外界环境对经营者收益降低的影响,提高了关联经营者对外界环境变动的敏感性。2)经营者道德风险加剧时,投资者收益大幅度下降。相较之下,投资者收益对外界环境变化的影响不敏感。3)外界环境变化以及经营者道德风险总是会降低社会福利。而对比无政治关联,政治关联降低了投资者收益和社会总福利。

Political connections are widespread in finns across the world and are associated with the country＇s or region＇s degree of financial market development, investor protection, and improvement in the legal system, and so on. An increasing number of politically connected firms are active in China＇s economic and social development. What economic consequences do political connections bring to finns？ On the one hand, political connections can make financing easier and bring in more resources for investment. When corporate value is measured with cash flow or the stock＇s market value, political connections are considered to be a valuable corporate resource. On the other hand, many recent studies have shown that the performance of politically connected finns is significantly lower than that of non-politically connected firms. There is no unified analytical framework to explain the operation of political connections. We assume that business operators in China are actively pursuing political connections in response to changing conditions in the environment outside the finn while operating in the presence of moral hazards. Previous studies have looked at these factors separately. In practice, political connections are likely to be interrelated with agency problems and changes in the external enviroment. In the analytical framework of contract theory, parties consider internal and external envh＇onments （participation constraints and/ncentive compatibilityconstraint conditions） and then make decisions in order to maximize their own income （including private gain）. Thus, contract theory can be useful to analyze objective influences （such as traditional culture, institutional environment, etc.） and subjective influences （including moral hazard） faced by the agent in a unified analytical framework. This shows us that we can m-examine political connections from the perspective of contract theory. However, the classic single-task principal-agent model cannot effectively explain both sides of the characteristics of political connections in the situation where political connections can bring in more resource inputs, and at the same time reduce corporate investment efficiency and value. Politically connected enterprise operators are facing more external influences and more serious agency problems. In addition, politically connected operators engage in more non-productive activities. Therefore, we believe that at the firm level political connections can be explained from the perspective of multi-tasking principal-agent problems. Based on the works of Robert Gibbons （2005） and George Baker （2002）, the two factors of outside uncontrollable objective environment changes and subjective managers moral hazard can influence political connections managers＇ decision-making. Based on the two-task principal-agent theoretical model and by using the method of theoretical model analysis and numerical simulation, the paper investigates how external environment factor and operators＇ moral hazard factor influence the income of politically connected operators and investors and how the two factors influence social welfare. The analyses show that 1） when managers face more external environmental impact, namely the high value of the environmental changes, the manager＇s loss in income can be offset by the increased level of distortion. In contrast, for managers without political connections having these connections can increase their sensitivity and alleviate the impact of changes in the external environment on the decrease of managers＇ income. Thus, the reasons that many companies actively seek political connections are both operators＇ measures taken in response to objective environmental changes and the result of maximizing their income in the context of China＇s transition economies. 2） There are negative impact and rapid decline on the investor revenue when a political connections manager has more moral hazard. In contrast, investor income is not sensitive to changes in external environment. This partly explains why China＇s investors hold a certain tolerance attitude toward firms/managers seeking political connections relationship. 3） The more changes in external environment and the more a manager＇s moral hazard, the lower degree of total social welfare is. Political connections have negative impact on the total social welfare.