风险企业家考虑公平关切的风险投资多阶段激励模型

Venture Investment Multi Stage Behavior Incentive Model of Basing on Venture Entrepreneur Having Investment Fairness Concerns

在风险投资关系中,风险投资家的分阶段激励是常见的一种控制模式,不同阶段风险企业家付出的努力是不同的,本文首先建立了基于不同时期付出不同努力的多阶段激励模型。进一步,一些实证和实践表明:风险投资家和风险企业家不仅具有自利偏好,还具有公平偏好,基于此,将行为经济学中的公平偏好理论植入到多阶段激励模型中,构建了多阶段行为激励模型,研究结果表明:如果风险企业家具有公平偏好,和完全理性相比,风险企业家会提高各期努力,但随着风险企业家嫉妒程度的加大,风险投资投资家对风险企业家的激励系数先增加后降低,在引入公平偏好之后,风险投资家和风险企业家的实际收益都得到了帕累托改进。

Venture investment is to invest in high-venture, high retum projects, and then sell or liquidate them for profit after these projects are successful. Venture projects involve external environment uncertainty, complexity, difficulty, etc. These factors may lead to venture capital insecurity. Therefore, how to ensure high return and capital safety for venture is important in theory and practice. From the income aspect, venture capitalists want to maximize share value, and venture entrepreneurs want to me, ximize their own utility. Because venture entrepreneurs are familiar with venture projects and have information advantage, there is a ＂moral hazard＂ between venture capitalists and venture entrepreneurs. The principal -- agent theory is adopted to study information asymmetry. The principal-agent relationship in venture capitals is that venture capitalists provide venture capital. Venture entrepreneurs provide value-added services for entrepreneurs and use enterprise development strategy to help grow venture enterprises. From the perspective of controlling all venture funds, stage investment is one of the effective methods to control low venture. Because venture entrepreneur effort requires a long-term process of constant change, the construction of multi stage principal-agent model design of incentive contracts can ensure that venture capitalists have optimal work effort at different stages, and control the safety of venture capital. Using multi-stage incentive of venture capitalist is one kind of common control methods to improve venture investment relations. Some empirical studies show that venture capitalists and venture entrepreneurs have not only self-interest preference, but also fairness preference. The fairness preference of behavioral economics is embedded into the multi-stage incentive model. As a result, the multi-stage behavior incentive model is established. The research results show that if venture entrepreneurs have fairness preference entrepreneurs will be completely rational and improve their efforts. However, with the increase of the degree of venture entrepreneur jealousy, incentive coefficient of venture investment to venture entrepreneur is firstly increased and then decreased. After introducing the fairness preference, the actual income of venture capitalists and venture entrepreneurs are Pareto improvement. The management practice of introducing fairness preference in the venture investment is that the revenue of venture capitalists or venture entrepreneurs, and the whole investment relations have been improved after the introduction of fairness preference. The main reason is that when venture enterprises have fair preference, venture capitalists will appropriate income of venture entrepreneurs. Venture capitalists transfer a portion of the revenue to venture entrepreneurs. Venture entrepreneurs work harder to return venture capital. Consequently, the output of project and the revenue of two sides have been improved.